In the context of …rm decision-making, several motives for acquiring and conveying information exist. Information serves to make better decisions, to persuade, and to impress. In this paper, we study how these motives shape incentives to acquire and communicate information. We employ a cheap-talk model with information acquisition and communication by a …rm's executive. The executive wants to accurately inform an internal decision-maker regarding the value of an opportunity, but has an incentive to overstate this value to persuade or impress external parties. We show that information acquisition and communication interact. The executive's impression and persuasion motives yield limited distortions in communication, if any. Instead, they reduce information acquisition. Furthermore, we …nd that for …rms, transparent communication is a necessary evil. Transparency allows for in ‡uential communication to external parties, but constrains internal communication. Theoretically, we contribute by showing that the forward induction re…nement excludes babbling as an equilibrium outcome if non-babbling equilibria exist. the seminar participants of the University of Bologna, Boston University, the University of Copenhagen, HSE Moscow, the University of Verona, and the Tinbergen Institute Brown Bag for their useful comments and suggestions. 10 If the executive could make the implementation decision herself rather than the insider, communication to the external party and the public is also non-informative. Hence, as anticipated by Cyert and March (1963), the e¤ects of an information system depend on the decision-making process. Aghion and Tirole (1997) model the interaction between the decision-making structure and information acquisition in …rms, and Dessein (2002) models the interaction between decision-making and communication. More recently, several papers study (de-)centralization and communication in situations where local units possess private information and potential bene…ts of coordination and adaptation exist (see, for example, Alonso et al., 2008 , Rantakari, 2008 , and Swank and Visser, 2015 . A key di¤erence between these studies and ours is that they take the distribution of information as given, whereas in our model part of the information has to be acquired.
Introduction
Ann is an executive at a US restaurant chain. She sees an opportunity to expand business towards The Netherlands. To explore and realize this opportunity, two items require speci…c attention. First, establishing a new restaurant in a particular Dutch town requires approval of the town council. The town council only approves if it is convinced that the restaurant will hire a su¢ cient number of local employees. Second, to determine the viability of the restaurant, she needs information on the local demand for US cuisine. This information can also be used to persuade the town council. Ann has delegated the …nal decision on the expansion to John, a loyal employee of the …rm who collects information about local suppliers, possible locations, local health and safety regulations, et cetera. Market research gives Ann information on potential customers. The more she spends on market research, the more detailed information she gets. As executive in charge of exploring this opportunity, Ann has to make several decisions. How much market research to do? What information to convey to the town council? What information to convey to John? Does it make sense to give the town council and John the same information?
In organizations, major decisions are rarely made by single individuals. As in the above restaurant example, the involvement of multiple parties in decision making raises questions regarding information collection and communication. In the context of …rm decision-making, several motives for acquiring and conveying information exist. First, information serves to make better decisions. Second, information acquisition and communication serve to persuade. If the execution of a …rm's plans requires approval of external stakeholders, information is collected and conveyed to gain approval. Third, collecting and transmitting information serve to impress. A …rm may bene…t from favorable perceptions held by outsiders regarding the …rm's prospects. 2 In this paper, we study theoretically how informational, persuasion, and impression motives shape …rms' incentives to acquire information and to convey it internally and externally. 3 We employ a cheap-talk model à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) with information acquisition and multiple audiences. We consider a …rm that sees an opportunity with uncertain payo¤. The …rm's executive decides about acquisition and communication of information on the value of the opportunity. 4 Exploring the opportunity requires the approval of an external party, which is provided only if the expected value is su¢ ciently high. Through this channel, we model the persuasion motive. The implementation decision is made by an internal party, who acts in the …rm's interest and has local information on the opportunity that is relevant for the implementation decision. This generates an informational motive. Finally, the executive cares about the …rm's stock price, which depends on external parties' perceptions of the …rm's value. This creates an impression motive. 5 The executive makes three decisions. First, she decides how much information to generate. Second, she decides about the transparency of the …rm's communication. She either sends a public message to all parties involved or she sends private messages. Finally, the executive decides what information to convey. 6 According to Cyert and March (1963, p .80 and p.127), these decisions together comprise a …rm's information system. 7 The persuasion and impression motive both give the executive an incentive to exaggerate the value of the opportunity in communication towards external parties. In contrast, the informational motive gives an incentive to communicate truthfully to the internal party. Hence, if the executive sends a public message, she faces a trade-o¤. Exaggerating may raise the …rm's stock price or may persuade an external party to approve, but it distorts internal decision making.
The recurrent theme of this paper is that information acquisition and communication are intertwined. One key result is that in equilibrium, the executive's 50 years ago, Mintzberg (1971) analyzed daily activities of top managers and reached a similar conclusion: top managers are pre-dominantly involved in collecting and sharing information. Hence his characterization of top managers as the 'nerve center'of their organizations. 5 The persuasion and impression motive both originate from beliefs held by external parties. We use persuasion to refer to situations where the executive's payo¤ depends on actions taken by people with non-aligned preferences in the decision-making process. The impression motive captures settings where the executive directly bene…ts from more favorable beliefs held by people not involved in the decision-making process. 6 Our paper considers acquisition and communication of strategic, forward-looking information. Measurement and reporting of …rms' past performance is heavily regulated. Still, the accounting literature documents substantial earnings management in reporting, often linked to managerial incentives (Watts and Zimmermann 1986, Habib and Hansen 2008) . Information gathered and reported for decision-making is far less subject to regulation. For instance, in the US, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 shelters …rms from possible litigation if forecasts turn out to be ill predictions ex post.
Theories on disclosure and reporting typically assume that …rms or managers possess, rather than acquire, private information, see e.g. Diamond (1985) , Dye (1985) , Stocken and Verrecchia (2004) , Goldman and Slezak (2006) , Crocker and Slemrod (2007) , and Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) . Notable exceptions are Pae (1999) , Hughes and Pae (2004) , and Einhorn and Ziv (2007) . 7 In Cyert and March (1963, p.80 and p.127), a …rm's information system describes how a …rm generates and condenses information, and how and what information is distributed internally and externally.
impression motive leads to limited distortions in communication, if any. Instead, it reduces information acquisition, even if information acquisition is costless. In our model, the cost of overstating …rm value, i.e., the distortion in internal decision making, is inversely related to the amount of information acquired. By acquiring less information, the executive e¤ectively commits herself to communicate truthfully. Still, the reduction in information acquisition yields sub-optimal internal decision-making. 8 We further show that the impression motive and the persuasion motive are imperfect substitutes in hindering communication and information acquisition. The impression motive gives the executive an incentive to overstate …rm value for any actual …rm value. The persuasion motive gives an incentive to exaggerate only if actual …rm value is low. If …rm value is su¢ ciently high, exaggeration is not necessary to gain approval, and the executive prefers to share her information. This result stems from the binary nature of the approval decision. We show that in equilibrium at most one report can induce the external party to deny approval. The executive has a strong incentive not to send this report. 9 Generally, the 8 The Enron scandal illustrates the impression motive at work at an extreme. In the years leading up to their demise in 2001, Enron's executives obsessively focused on raising the stock price. They convinced analysts and investors that Enron's prospects were glorious; Fortune named Enron the most innovative company for six consecutive years up to 2000. Internally, they demanded ever-higher revenues, which led to a series of bad investment decisions. Despite such setbacks, Enron's executives kept expressing con…dence in the …rm's value and prospects to the outside world. Besides stock-based incentives, observers attribute the executives' behavior largely to their desire to impress others (McLean and Elkind 2003; Eichenwald 2005) . Employees who critized projects were removed from these projects, and internal warnings on malpractice were ignored (Behr and Witt 2002a, 2002b; Free and Macintosh 2008). Recalling how CEO Kenneth Lay handled internal warnings, a former CFO of one of Enron's units noted "[he] has always been hands o¤ even in his best days. ... My surmise is he didn't want to be informed. His attitude was, 'I don't want to know'"(Behr and Witt 2002b). In Enron's case, reputational concerns led to decision makers who are poorly informed.
Our model also speaks to less extreme situations. For instance, an increasing number of …rms provide forward-looking statements, such as management earnings forecasts, often based on non-veri…able information (Bozanic et al. 2018). Despite the widespread concern that such statements can deliberately be misleading, investors and analysts do respond to this information (Patell 1976 , Penman 1980 , Waymire 1986 , and Jennings 1987 . Investors primarily respond to credible information (Bamber and Cheon 1998 , Hutton et al. 2003 , Dzieliński et al. 2017 ). In line with our results, Graham et al. (2005) present survey evidence suggesting that managers are willing to make decisions that reduce project quality if this prevents a negative …nancial report. 9 The persuasion motive played an important role in the Volkswagen scandal. Increased emission standards forced Volkswagen to improve its diesel engines. Experts were doubtful about the possibility to meet the standards, but Volkswagen kept exploring and ultimately claimed to have found a solution. The new engines received regulatory approval, and Volkswagen's executives expressed their con…dence in the new technology (Volkswagen Group 2012). In 2015, fraudulent software was exposed. The software made engines appear cleaner during regulatory tests than during regular driving. executive's response to her persuasion motive is to reduce information acquisition, and to distort communication if …rm value is low but less so if …rm value is high.
Our paper also highlights the role of transparency in communication for information systems. If the executive can send private reports, she shares all her information privately with insiders. This serves the informational motive. This also eliminates the costs of sending distorted messages to outsiders. Hence, in equilibrium, outsiders receive only non-informative messages. 10 In the absence of the persuasion motive, the possibility of privately informing insiders typically leads to proper decision making based on the optimal amount of information. However, if the external party needs to be persuaded, the executive must impose transparent reporting, despite the resulting reduction in information acquisition and, hence, in the quality of internal decision making. For a …rm, transparency is a necessary evil.
We view our analysis as a …rst step towards a theory of information systems. A …rst step, because, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the …rst that examines in a single setting how internal and external forces shape decisions in …rms regarding transparency of communication, how much information is generated, and which information is conveyed internally and externally. A …rst step, because, the model is setup with a view of readily distinguishing three motives of acquiring and conveying information. This enables us to identify the e¤ects of changes in the relative importance of these three motives on a …rm's information system. In practice, however, these three motives are more blurred than in our model. In particular, the persuasion and impression motives may be more important internally than we assume. Our model is also only a …rst step, as it does not capture all aspects of an information system. For example, our analysis abstracts from the time dimension. If delaying decision-making is costly, this a¤ects the duration of the search for information. Implicitly, we assume that the cost of information acquisition also includes the cost of delay. Relatedly, if information is collected over time, a relevant question is when to communicate. Recently, Grenadier et al. (2016) and Orlov et al. (2018) consider timing of communication in dynamic frameworks, analyzing how the release of information depends on the alignment of the preferences of the sender and receiver. Furthermore, we do not explicitly model how and by whom information is collected. In practice, many parties in …rms are involved in gathering, recording, and processing information. Team theory, starting with Marschak and Radner (1972) , analyzes how …rms handle information when processing is costly. Crucially, team theory assumes everyone shares the same objective. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) show that to handle ‡ows of information most e¤ectively, …rms create networks of individuals that resemble classic forms of organizations. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) take the network as given and analyze the e¤ects of alternative decision processes if individuals can make mistakes. Our paper is in ‡uenced by team theory in placing information at the heart of the analysis of organizations. However, we take the network, or organizational form, as given. Instead, we focus on how divergence of individuals' objectives a¤ects how much information is collected, what information is conveyed and to whom it is conveyed. Even though we regard our paper as applied theory, we also make a theoretical contribution. We show that forward induction as an equilibrium re…nement excludes babbling as an equilibrium outcome if non-babbling equilibria exist. Loosely speaking, forward induction requires previous actions to be rational. In our model this implies that if babbling is an equilibrium outcome, the executive has not acquired any information. It would be a pure waste. Yet, this also implies that by acquiring some information, the executive can avoid a babbling equilibrium. This result is interesting in itself, in the sense that virtually all papers that use a cheaptalk model à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) acknowledge that one equilibrium of their models is the babbling one. Argenziano et al. (2016) even use the babbling equilibrium as an o¤-equilibrium-path punishment by the receiver, which induces the sender to overinvest in information collection. If forward induction is imposed, babbling is no longer a credible threat. We derive conditions under which forward induction selects a unique equilibrium.
Our results are derived from a cheap-talk model with information acquisition and multiple receivers. As one of our objectives is to better understand executives' incentives to manipulate information -one of the observations by Cyert and March -our choice for a cheap-talk model seems natural. A Bayesian Persuasion model à la Gentzkov and Kamenica (2011 and 2014) is more suitable for studying settings where …rms are legally obliged to reveal all information gathered. One way of looking at our results is that in a cheap-talk setting the need to persuade or the desire to impress is costly for …rms. It leads to internal decisions based on too little information. As a result, …rms may look for other ways of making messages to outsiders credible, for example by hiring auditors. To examine those settings, the model of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) seems appropriate. Following Milgrom and Roberts (1986) , they assume veri…able information that can be concealed, but not manipulated. Then, the need to persuade strengthens incentives to gather information. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) were the …rst to analyze a cheap-talk model with multiple receivers. Comparing public and private communication, they showed that a public message can be more informative than separate, private messages if preferences are su¢ ciently misaligned. This carries over to our model, where informative communication to the public and the external party requires the informational motive of communication to the insider. Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) generalize Farrell and Gibbons (1989) by allowing for a more general distribution of sender types. By adding an information acquisition stage, the number of sender types is endogenous in our model. Taking information acquisition into account, we show that public communication is more informative than private communication if the sender needs to persuade, but may lead to less information acquisition if the sender only wants to impress. 11 Di Pei (2015) and Argenziano et al. (2016) consider information acquisition in a cheap-talk model with one receiver. In Di Pei (2015) , the sender can …rst segment the state space in any arbitrary way, and subsequently learns in which segment the true state lies. Finer segmentation is more costly. The main result is that the sender never collects more precise information than she can communicate in equilibrium. In our model, the sender also segments the state space, but it is assumed that all segments are equally large. In Argenziano et al. (2016) , the sender chooses the accuracy of information by deciding how many Bernoulli trials to conduct. Their way of modeling information acquisition can be regarded as a micro-foundation of the technology we assume. 12 The next section describes the model. In Section 3, we present the analysis and results, and in Section 4, we apply the forward induction re…nement. In Section 5, we extend our model to discuss the pros and cons of transparency. We conclude by discussing the implications of our …ndings for understanding …rms'information systems in Section 6.
The Model
We consider a …rm that sees an opportunity, called the project. The pro…tability of the project depends on the value of the …rm's ongoing activities, represented 11 Using the Bayesian Persuasion framework, Michaeli (2017) shows that the sender may acquire more information if only a subset rather than all receivers obtain the information acquired. 12 In Dur and Swank (2005) , the sender exerts costly e¤ort that increases the quality of her signal about the state of the world. They show that the receiver bene…ts from a sender whose preferences deviate from his own preferences, as this increases the incentive to exert e¤ort. Che and Kartik (2009) derive a similar result for the case that the sender and receiver have di¤erent priors.
by random variable v, and on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the project, represented by random variable z. The incremental value of the project to the …rm is (v z), where measures the importance of the project relative to the ongoing activities. Both v and z are independently and uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1].
Our model is designed to investigate the incentives of an executive, X, who has three motives for acquiring and conveying information about v. The …rst motive we consider is a persuasion motive. We model this motive by assuming that exploration of the project, through which z is learnt, requires the approval of an External party, E. Second, we model an informational motive. We assume that the …nal decision on the project is made by an Insider, I, whose preferences are perfectly aligned with those of X. Finally, to model the impression motive we assume that X is concerned with the Public's, P , perception of …rm value.
At the beginning of the game, X acquires information about v. The accuracy of information is re ‡ected by a 2 N. For any given a, the interval [0; 1] is split into a subintervals of equal length. Let k 2 f1; ::; ag denote the subinterval k 1 a ; k a . X observes to which subinterval v belongs. We refer to k as X's type. Clearly, the higher is a, the more accurate is X's information about v. The cost of acquiring information is (a 1) c. After learning her type k,
X's choice of a is publicly observed. 13 Her type, however, is private information. After X learns her type, she sends cheap-talk reports to E, I, and P . We consider two communication regimes: transparency and non-transparency. We start with the analysis of the case where communication is transparent: X sends a public report, r, to E, I, and P . In Section 5, we analyze the case where communication is non-transparent: X sends a private report r I to I and another private report r E to E and P . Under both regimes, reports can take values from any su¢ ciently large report space. For brevity, in the remainder of this section we denote X's reports by r. It is straightforward to adjust this to the non-transparency regime. As mentioned above, exploration and implementation of the project requires E's approval. We denote E's approval decision by d E 2 f0; 1g, where d E = 1 denotes approval and d E = 0 denotes rejection. If d E = 0, the game ends. If d E = 1, I explores the project, observes z, and makes the implementation decision, d I 2 f0; 1g, where d I = 1 denotes that the project is implemented, and d I = 0 denotes that it is not. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of our model. We denote …rm value by w:
Following Stein (1989) , we assume that X is concerned with w and with the …rm's stock price, s. Hence X's payo¤ is equal to
Note that stock price s equals P 's perception of …rm value w, conditional on r and d E . Hence, X cares about the stock price that arises after E has made his approval decision, but before the implementation decision is made. 14 The parameter 2 [0; 1] denotes the relative weight on the stock price in X's utility, which can be interpreted as the strength of stock-based remuneration. In our model, it re ‡ects the strength of the impression motive. E's payo¤ is
Threshold h is the cost, borne by E, of allowing X to explore the project. Equation (5) captures that E approves exploration if the option value of the project exceeds threshold h. Through h we model the persuasion motive. Lastly, I's payo¤ is equal to X's payo¤, u I = u X . We abstract from agency problems between X and I to model the informational motive. X wants to share collection. 14 This could, for instance, re ‡ect short-term …nancial incentives. Stein (1989) discusses several other reasons why executives may care about current stock prices, as implied by (3) . None of our results under public reporting change if X cares about the stock price that realizes after P observes decision d I , instead of before.
her information with I. 15 As is clear from (2) , the importance of the project for …rm value and, hence, the importance of I's decision is given by . Hence, re ‡ects the strength of the informational motive.
Our model is stylized, but captures in a natural way the trade-o¤s faced by an executive who wants to persuade, impress, and inform. By sending r, X wants E to approve, s to be high, and I to make the proper decision on the project. We solve the model for Sequential Equilibria (SEQ). In the main text below, we o¤er a relatively informal analysis and discussion. In the Appendix, we provide formal results and proofs. We use the following notation regarding players'strategies and beliefs. A SEQ consists of a collection ( ; (k; a)) of behavioral strategies of X, an approval strategy E (r; a) of E, a decision strategy I (z; r; a) of I, and beliefs G (kjr; a) of I, E, and P about X's type such that:
1. For any a, z, and r, decision d I = I (z; r; a) maximizes I's expectation of (3) given belief G (kjr; a);
2. For any a and r, approval decision d E = E (r; a) maximizes E's expectation of (5) given belief G (kjr; a);
3. For any a and type k, report r = (k; a) maximizes X's expectation of (3); 4. Information accuracy, a = maximizes X's expectation of (3).
Beliefs G (kjr; a) follow
Bayes'rule on all information sets.
By (a), we denote the continuation game that is played after a is chosen and observed. In a Sequential Equilibrium, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is played in (a) for any a 2 N. In the remainder, for brevity we omit variable a from argument lists of functions and expectations whenever it does not lead to confusion.
As is usual in cheap-talk models, the 'language'of the reporting strategy (k) is de…ned only in equilibrium. Multiple reporting strategies can lead to the same beliefs and, hence, to the same equilibrium outcome. We ignore this type of equilibrium multiplicity. Therefore, we construct equilibrium sets by placing all equilibria with outcome-equivalent reporting strategies into one set. We refer to such an equilibrium set as an 'equilibrium'.
Cheap-talk games are also plagued by non-outcome-equivalent equilibrium multiplicity. The babbling equilibrium always exists. Hence, any equilibrium with in ‡uential communication is never the unique equilibrium. In Section 4, we show that if an equilibrium with in ‡uential communication exists, the forward induction re…nement eliminates the babbling equilibrium. Furthermore, for some range of parameter values, forward induction yields a unique equilibrium outcome, in which in ‡uential communication does take place.
Before turning to the analysis of the game, we …rst determine the accuracy of information if X were to choose a in the absence of a persuasion and impression motive (h = 0 and = 0), and X reveals her type to I, r = k. For ease of exposition, we present the optimal a as a continuous variable. X anticipates that I implements whenever she learns that z < E (vjk), which happens with probability 
When choosing a, X's expectation of project value equals
The marginal bene…t of a to project value is given by the derivative of (6). Equating this to marginal cost c yields the optimal accuracy a opt :
The value a opt measures the accuracy of information that maximizes …rm value in the absence of persuasion and reputational motives, provided the implementation decision is optimal for every type of X. We refer to underinvestment (overinvestment) in information acquisition if X chooses a < a opt (a > a opt ).
Analysis
We begin the analysis by considering a continuation game (a) that follows a choice of accuracy a, given transparency in communication. As insider I's and executive X's preferences are perfectly aligned, maximizing (3) yields that I chooses to implement the project, d I = 1, if his expectation of project value given report r is positive, i.e., if E [vjr] > z, and chooses d I = 0 otherwise. When making the approval decision, external party E anticipates I's strategy. Maximizing (5) yields that E approves if the option value of the project given r exceeds threshold h.
Lemma 1 characterizes X's equilibrium communication strategy in (a) and presents two immediate consequences.
Lemma 1 Consider a continuation game (a). In any equilibrium of (a):
(i) there is a number of distinct reports N 2 f1; : : : ; ag and a set of N marginal types fk n g, with k n 1 < k n , k 0 = 0 and k N = a, so that for all n 2 f1; : : : ; N g, all types k 2 f(k n 1 + 1) ; : : : ; k n g send report r n ;
(ii) if 1 2 , then N = 1, and the pooling equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of (a);
(iii) only report r 1 may lead to E's disapproval, i.e., E (r 1 ) = f0; 1g and E (r n ) = 1 for n 2.
Item (i) of Lemma 1 states that in a PBE, every report is sent by a subset of adjacent executive types k. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . The top drawing depicts a separating equilibrium following a choice of a = 4. Each of the four types k sends a di¤erent report r n , and the total number of reports N = 4. The bottom drawing depicts a semi-pooling equilibrium following a = 14, with N = 5. Types k 2 f1; 2; 3g send report r 1 , types k 2 f4; 5; 6; 7; 8g send report r 2 , types k 2 f9; 10g send r 3 , and so on. Marginal types k n are the highest types that send reports r n , i.e., k 1 = 3 and k 2 = 8, etc. As there are a di¤erent types, k N = a in any equilibrium. Furthermore, each marginal type k n is the highest type that (weakly) prefers sending report r n over sending report r n+1 . E.g., in the bottom drawing of Figure 2 , type k = 3 must prefer sending r 1 over r 2 , whereas type k = 4 must prefer sending r 2 over r 1 . 16 In the communication stage, the informational motive meets the persuasion and impression motives. Consequently, X faces a dilemma. On the one hand, she wants to inform I about value v in order to maximize project value. On the other hand, she has an incentive to overstate v for two reasons. First, overstating v may persuade E to approve. Second, overstating v increases P 's expectation of …rm value and, hence, increases stock price s. The relative strength of the impression motive depends on how much X cares about the …rm's stock price, . This drives item (ii) in Lemma 1. If X cares too much about s, she cannot credibly communicate her value. Anticipating this, she does not invest in acquiring information, and chooses a = 1. If is su¢ ciently small, X's incentive to overstate v is o¤set by the distortion it induces in I's decision. Then, the informational motive makes informative communication possible, by imposing a cost of overstating.
To see why only report r 1 may lead to E's disapproval (item iii), suppose that E does not approve after receiving either of two distinct reports which lead to di¤erent stock prices. As neither report is used to decide about project implementation, X faces no cost of overstating. Absent the informational motive, the impression motive induces X to always send the report that leads to a higher stock price. Hence, in equilibrium, at most one report can lead to rejection by E.
The informational motive implies that X wants I to have an accurate view of value v after receiving the report. It is useful to distinguish between two factors that together determine the e¤ectiveness of communication. The …rst factor is the number of distinct reports N used. More distinct reports imply that I can receive more precise information. Let N denote the maximum number of reports over all equilibria of all continuation games for all a: N ( ; ; h) max fN 2 N : 9 a 2 N such that (a) has a PBE with N reportsg Lemma 2 shows that the informational motive facilitates using more distinct reports, whereas the persuasion and impression motives hinder this.
Lemma 2
The maximum number of reports N ( ; ; h) over all equilibria of all continuation games is weakly increasing in and weakly decreasing in and in h.
The second factor that determines the e¤ectiveness of communication is the relative precision of the reports. Given N , communication is most e¤ective if all reports are equally precise, i.e., if each report is sent by the same number of types. For a given a, communication is most e¤ective in the separating equilibrium, provided it exists. Hence, if the separating equilibrium with a = N exists, this equilibrium yields the most accurate communication. However, if the separating equilibrium with a = N does not exist, a trade-o¤ arises. Then, a higher number of reports can lead to less e¤ective communication, if it comes at the expense of the relative precision of reports. 17 As shown below, this implies that X can prefer an equilibrium with N < N reports over all equilibria with N reports.
Informing versus Impressing
In this section, we discuss equilibria where external party E always approves exploration of the project, d E = 1, so that the persuasion motive plays no role. This requires h to be su¢ ciently small. One of the novel insights of our paper is that if E's approval strategy imposes no constraints, executive X's incentive to overstate value v hardly leads to distortions in her reports. Instead, the impression motive weakens her incentives to acquire information. We discuss this result in two steps. First, we show that acquiring …ner information, i.e., a higher level of a, narrows the range of for which a separating equilibrium exists. Second, we show that X prefers to avoid distorting communication. This implies that the impression motive induces X to acquire more coarse information. 18 Lemma 3 Consider a continuation game (a). A separating equilibrium of (a) in which all types receive approval of E exists if and only if a a 1 +
+ 2 (8)
and h h (a) 8a 2 (9) Lemma 3 implies that acquiring too precise information makes sharing all information impossible. In other words, too much information acquisition necessitates distorting communication. To understand this result, note that a separating equilibrium requires that for all types k, the net bene…t of overstating v by sending 17 The two equilibria in Figure 2 illustrate this. Assuming that all reports lead to approval, expected project value is higher in the equilibrium in the top drawing than in the equilibrium in the bottom drawing, despite the higher number of reports used in the latter. Typically, in applications of cheap-talk models à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) without information acquisition, the number of reports sent in equilibrium is a su¢ cient measure of the e¤ectiveness of communication. 18 In Lemma 3, bxc denotes the ‡oor function, which gives the largest integer not exceeding x: bxc = maxfn 2 Zjn xg. This ensures that a is an integer. report r k+1 ("my type is k +1") instead of r k should be negative. If all reports lead to E's approval, as ensured by (9), the cost of overstating (distorting insider I's implementation decision) is constant in type k, whereas the bene…t (higher stock price s) is increasing in k. Consequently, type k = a 1 has the largest incentive to deviate from truth-telling.
Crucially, as long as the informational motive is su¢ ciently important, X prefers exaggerating to a limited extent over exaggerating a lot. Expected project value decreases quadratically in the di¤erence between the actual v and I's expectation of v after receiving the report. Hence, X abstains from making too large overstatements. Coarse information (i.e., low a) only allows X to overstate heavily, whereas …ne information enables X to overstate v by a limited amount. As a result, the maximum level of accuracy at which X can credibly communicate her type is limited, as given by (8). This maximum level is decreasing in the strength of the impression motive and increasing in the strength of the informational motive .
In a separating equilibrium, the number of distinct reports N equals a. Thus, a in equation (8) (ii) if 2 4+3 ; 1 2 so that a = 1, then N ( ; ; h) 2.
Case (i) implies that if the impression motive is not too strong, X cannot use more reports in any equilibrium than in the most informative separating equilibrium. Hence, increasing a beyond a does not lead to more messages, but only to distorted communication and, hence, to less informed decisions. To understand the intuition behind this result, suppose that a > a 2. 20 According to Lemma 3, the separating equilibrium of (a) does not exist because type k = a 1 wants to deviate. Consequently, at least the top two types pool and send the same report. However, as types pool, sending N reports requires a > N . As a higher a further strengthens the incentive to exaggerate, this yields even more pooling. As a result, for a > a the maximum number of messages (or partitions) in the communication stage does not increase with a.
Using Lemma's 1 to 4, we can characterize the information acquisition and communication strategy of X in equilibrium. If h is small such that E approves after receiving any report (in equilibrium), the communication continuation game is akin to a cheap talk game as in Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Typically, such games are characterized by multiplicity of equilibria. Ours is no exception. In Proposition 1, we describe the equilibrium path of the sender-optimal equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium that is optimal for X. 21 In Section 4 we show that this equilibrium path is the unique forward induction outcome.
Proposition 1 Let a be a min a; a opt (10)
Suppose that h h (a ), 1 and 4+3 so that a 2. The unique equilibrium outcome that maximizes the ex-ante expected utility of X consists of accuracy = a followed by the separating equilibrium of the continuation game.
Proposition 1 presents two results. First, X's impression motive to exaggerate v in the hope of in ‡uencing the …rm's stock price does not lead to distorted communication. Reports do not contain pooled information. Instead, the impression motive leads to less information acquisition. The number of distinct reports that X can credibly send is limited. These messages are most e¢ ciently used when each message is equally likely to be sent in equilibrium. The separating equilibrium achieves this, at lowest cost. Second, X's choice of accuracy is either driven by the cost of information c or by the relative weight X attributes to the …rm's stock price . If information is costly and the impression motive relatively weak, X chooses the level of accuracy that maximizes …rm value, a opt . If, instead, information is cheap and the impression motive strong, such that a < a opt , X's incentive to overstate v leads to underinvestment in information.
Proposition 1 assumes h h (a ), 1 and a 2. We discuss these assumptions in reversed order. First, if a = 1, the impression motive is so strong that no separating equilibrium exists for any a (Lemma 3) and that any non-pooling equilibrium of the continuation game is a semi-pooling equilibrium with N = 2 messages, which requires a 3 (Lemma 4). Corollary 1 immediately follows. 22 
Corollary 1 Let
1, h = 0, and 2 4+3 ; 1 2 so that a = 1. The unique equilibrium outcome that maximizes ex ante expected utility of X:
(i) either has accuracy = 1 followed by the pooling equilibrium of the continuation game, or
(ii) has accuracy 3 followed by a semi-pooling equilibrium of the continuation game with N = 2 reports. Moreover, ! 1 if and only if % 2(2+ ) and c ! 0.
If c is su¢ ciently small, X optimally chooses a > a to enable some information transmission. Moreover, , i.e., the optimal value of a, converges to in…nity only if this is necessary for having two distinct reports in equilibrium, i.e., if converges to 2(2+ ) from below. Note that if the impression motive induces some pooling in equilibrium, pooling takes place at the top. This is typical in cheap-talk games.
Now, consider the case where > 1. The value of can be interpreted as the importance of the informational motive relative to the impression motive. Above we have shown that if the impression motive is relatively important ( 1), acquiring precise information leads to a semi-pooling equilibrium where reports are used too ine¢ ciently. By acquiring less information, X reduces her incentive to overstate and, thereby, the need for pooling information to communicate credibly. For higher values of , the incentive to overstate …rm value is weaker. This means that if in equilibrium some pooling occurs, reports are still used relatively e¢ ciently, so that the cost of pooling is small. This allows for continuation game equilibria with a higher number of reports used e¢ ciently enough to outperform the best-possible separating equilibrium. We cannot fully characterize the sender-optimal equilibria for > 1. However, numerical simulations show that the di¤erences with the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 are small. We …nd that sender-optimal equilibria with > a 2 exist only if a is su¢ ciently small. In these equilibria, only the top two types pool, so that = a + 2 and N = a + 1. This holds even if c = 0. Hence, there can be a limited amount of distorted communication if > 1, but X's incentive to overstate v is still pre-dominantly re ‡ected by less information acquisition. Figure 3 depicts numerically computed in a sender-optimal SEQ as a function of c for various levels of under the assumptions = 0:1 and h = 0. The graph for = 1 gives as described in Proposition 1. If = 1 and c is su¢ ciently small, X optimally chooses = a = 2. The graph also shows that for = 3 and low values of c, = a = 4. For higher values of , e.g., for = 100, the graph shows that for low values of c, = 7 whereas a = 5. Hence = a + 2, but only when c is su¢ ciently small. The graph also shows that is decreasing in c. Figure 4 also depicts , but now for = 0:01. As compared to Figure 3 , a is higher for each value of . Now, the only e¤ect of an increase in is an increase in a. In any sender-optimal equilibrium, = a , as in case of 1 (Proposition 1). Lastly, Figure 5 shows that in a sender-optimal SEQ is non-monotonic in . Starting from = N = a for small values of , an increase in can sustain a semi-pooling equilibrium with = a + 2 and N = a + 1. If increases further, a increases by 1, which renders this separating equilibrium optimal. Figure 5 also shows that when the information motive becomes more important, the maximum number of reports in any equilibrium, N , increases. However, when is su¢ ciently high, it is not optimal for X to opt for an equilibrium with N reports. In these semi-pooling equilibria, reports are used ine¢ ciently. X is better o¤ acquiring less information (even when c = 0) which either prevents pooling altogether, or allows for very limited pooling (only the two highest types pool, and = a + 2). Despite fewer reports, communication is more e¤ective as (almost) all reports are equally precise.
The condition h h (a ) in Proposition 1 ensures external party E's approval in equilibrium, even if X sends r 1 . If h slightly exceeds h (a ), X can induce E to always approve the project by choosing a < a . The cost of reducing a is, as before, an implementation decision based on less information. Through this channel, the impression motive may lead to a further underinvestment in information collection. Alternatively, X accepts that E may reject the project, as analyzed in the next section.
Informing versus Persuading (and Impressing)
Now suppose that threshold h is su¢ ciently large, such that it is not possible or not optimal for X to choose an a that ensures E's unconditional approval of exploration of the project. Hence, a persuasion motive is present. At least one type does not receive E's approval in equilibrium. This hurts X, who prefers to minimize this probability. The optimal equilibrium outcome for X di¤ers in two ways from the outcome stated in Proposition 1. It is possible that some reports are sent by multiple types and, therefore, the equilibrium of the continuation game is a semi-pooling equilibrium. As a result, the optimal value of a for X is a¤ected by all parameters (c; h; ; ).
To highlight the e¤ects of X's need to persuade E to get approval, we consider the case where c is in…nitely small. Furthermore, we …rst assume that is also in…nitely small. This eliminates the impression motive. Then, in the absence of the need to persuade (h = 0), the optimal outcome would be a choice of a ! 1 followed by the separating equilibrium. The key result of this section is that h > 0 limits credible communication, which, in turn, induces X to acquire only a limited amount of information. Remarkably, if pooling occurs in equilibrium, we have pooling by the lowest types.
Lemma 5 shows the upper bound of the maximum number of reports in equilibrium.
Lemma 5 Consider the maximum number of reports N over all equilibria of all continuation games. In the limit when ! 0, N has the following upper-bound: Lemma 5 implies that h limits communication, akin to the role of in Lemma 4. Given ! 0, each type who receives approval in equilibrium would like to reveal its type. However, for types that do not receive approval, the incentive to misreport is very strong, as revealing one's type implies losing the option value of the project. As only the …rst report receives no approval (Lemma 1), the incentive to misreport v is largest for type k 1 , the highest type in the …rst partition that reports r 1 and gets no approval. To prevent this type from misreporting, sending r 2 must lead to a negative expected project value for type k 1 . This requires that the second partition (i.e., the number of types that send r 2 ) must be su¢ ciently wide, which, in turn, requires that the third partition is also su¢ ciently wide, and so on. As an increase in a brings E [vjk 1 ] closer to the border between the …rst and second partition, the width of the second partition must also increase in a.
In choosing a, X faces the following trade-o¤: a higher a leads to better project decisions when k is su¢ ciently large, but to worse decisions when k is small. Furthermore, X prefers to choose an a such that the …rst partition is small. The e¤ect of a on the length of the …rst partition can be erratic, especially for small values of a. 23 This prevents us from making precise analytical statements concerning , the optimal value of a, except that the persuasion motive induces X to choose a …nite even though she could observe v for free by taking a ! 1.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where ! 0 and c ! 0. An equilibrium that maximizes the ex ante expected utility of X always exists and is generically unique. There exists a …nite number b a such that in this equilibrium, X chooses a b a.
Proposition 1 states that for small values of h, X chooses a …nite a, even if c ! 0. Proposition 2 states that this also holds for high values of h. The incentive for X to persuade E to approve limits communication, in particular after acquiring precise information. Acquiring less information improves the e¤ectiveness of communication.
Proposition 2 does not exclude partially pooling equilibria, in contrast to Proposition 1. To understand why, consider a separating equilibrium in which d E (r 1 ) = 0. As discussed above, a should be su¢ ciently small to prevent type k = 1 of X from sending r 2 . The bene…t of coarse information acquisition only realizes when k = 1. However, the cost of coarse information is poor decisionmaking by I, which realizes for all types k > 1. Hence, X may prefer to choose a value of a such that some pooling occurs. If so, pooling occurs pre-dominantly for low types. In the absence of the impression motive, the width of partitions is decreasing beyond the second partition. Table 1 . Values of and N in sender-optimal SEQ for various levels of h, when ! 0, c ! 0, and = 1. Column 'Communication'shows the number of types sending identical reports (pools). This highlights another di¤erence between the e¤ects of the impression motive and the persuasion motive. If the impression motive leads to distortions in communication (e.g., if > 1), we obtain pooling at the top, as is typical in cheaptalk games. The persuasion motive, however, leads to pooling at the bottom, as it induces an incentive to overstate v that is stronger for low types than for high types. This also implies that adding an impression motive to the persuasion motive, hence allowing > 0, further restricts communication. Figure 6 depicts in sender-optimal SEQ as a function of for various levels of h, given c = 0 and = 1, obtained numerically. If h = 0, Proposition 1 implies that = a, which is decreasing in provided a 2. For > 1 7 , a = 1 and N = 2, and Corollary 1 states that a 3 can be optimal. Figure 6 depicts this: keeps increasing in up to the spike at = 1 6 . A positive value of h generally reduces if is small, as illustrated by graphs for h = 0:05 and h = 0:17. 25 This shows that the persuasion motive and impression motive are imperfect substitutes in hindering communication and, consequently, in reducing optimal information acquisition.
For h = 0:17, E does not approve after report r 1 . Hence, X needs to take into account the positive probability of being denied approval when determining . If gets larger, the impression motive interferes with the motive to persuade E. For small values of , X responds by increasing a, but as becomes larger, X can no longer credibly send a report that secures approval. As a consequence, = 1 for large values of , and only the babbling equilibrium remains.
Forward Induction Re…nement
Proposition 1 gives the sender-optimal equilibrium when h is small. It is wellknown that cheap-talk models à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) generally have multiple equilibria. In particular, if any equilibrium with in ‡uential communication exists, the equilibrium without in ‡uential communication (so called 'babbling' equilibrium) also exists. In our model, the communication game is preceded by an information acquisition stage. This enables us to apply a forward induction re…nement. Loosely speaking, forward induction assumes that in equilibrium past actions have been rational. Proposition 3 shows that the sender-optimal equilibrium is the unique equilibrium selected by the forward induction re…nement, given c > 0 and the conditions under which Proposition 1 holds.
Proposition 3
Suppose that c > 0, h h (a ), 1 and 4+3 so that a 2. Then, Proposition 1 characterizes the unique forward induction equilibrium outcome.
To illustrate how forward induction selects a unique equilibrium, suppose a 2 and h h (a ). If X has chosen a = 1, no information can be conveyed in the communication game. Now suppose a = 2. In the continuation game (2), a pooling equilibrium as well as a separating equilibrium exist. However, for c > 0, the pooling equilibrium does not satisfy forward induction: choosing a = 1 yields a higher payo¤ to X than choosing a = 2 followed by pooling. Hence, after observing a = 2, forward induction implies that neither E nor I expect themselves to play the pooling equilibrium in (2) . Therefore, a = 2 followed by pooling does not satisfy the forward induction re…nement.
This line of reasoning extends to higher levels of information acquisition too. Suppose that a 3 and that X has chosen a = 3. Again, pooling and semipooling equilibria exist in (3), but a = 2 followed by the separating equilibrium would yield a higher payo¤ to X than a = 3 followed by pooling or partially pooling. Consequently, for a = 3, none of the (partially) pooling equilibria satisfy forward induction. This process of eliminating equilibria ends when a = a = min fa; a opt g. Choosing a > a reduces X's payo¤ either because acquiring more information is too expensive (a > a opt ) or because more information does not lead to more informative communication (a > a). Hence, the forward induction re…nement selects the sender-optimal equilibrium as the unique equilibrium outcome. 26 The same argument implies that forward induction excludes the babbling equilibrium outcome whenever there exists an a and an equilibrium of (a) that yields a higher payo¤ to X than choosing a = 1.
Corollary 2 If for someâ > 1, the continuation game (â) has an equilibrium that yields a higher payo¤ to X than (1), then â followed by the pooling equilibrium of (a) is not a forward induction equilibrium outcome.
For forward induction to be applicable, it is crucial that information acquisition is observable. As discussed in Footnote 13, in the context of the situations of our model, this assumption is often met. In other settings, however, information acquisition is not observable. See Argenziano et al. (2016) for a thorough discussion of 'covert'information acquisition.
Transparency
This section discusses the role of transparency in our model. In the previous sections, communication by X was fully transparent: insider I, external party E, and public P received the same report. Firms can also choose to be less transparent. Proposition 4 states how much information executive X collects and what she communicates if she can send a private report to I and another private report to E and P . 27 Proposition 4 Suppose X sends private report r I to I and private report r E to E and P . An equilibrium in which X truthfully reports its type to I always exists. In this equilibrium: (ii) the report of X to E and P is uninformative; Forward induction then selects all these equilibria of (a), implying that there can be no unique forward induction equilibrium outcome. 27 We have also considered the case where on top of a public report, X can send a private report to I. The equilibrium presented in Proposition 4 carries over to that setting.
Non-transparency induces complete information sharing within the …rm, but renders any communication with outsiders non-informative. If approval is provided nonetheless, X chooses the level of information acquisition that maximizes project value. If, instead, E does not approve in the absence of an informative report, information acquisition is worthless.
The strategy of I, item (i), is the same as before. As r I is only received by I, only the informational motive a¤ects the content of r I . The preference alignment of X and I allows for sharing all information. Item (ii) in Proposition 4 is a direct consequence of the misalignment of preferences between X on the one hand and E and P on the other. As the decision by I is not a¤ected by r E , the informational motive is absent in determining r E . In isolation, the persuasion motive and the impression motive obstruct in ‡uential communication.
Anticipating I's strategy, E infers that the expected project value is given by (6). Lacking any further information, item (iii) implies that E approves if the expected project value is greater than threshold h. Clearly, E is more willing to approve if accuracy a is higher. A more accurate information system implies that I makes a better decision, leading to higher expected project value. The condition in item (iii) shows that, independent of a, E never approves if h > 6 , whereas E always approves if h < 8 .
Item (iv) in Proposition 4 shows that if X is not constrained by E's approval decision, she chooses the level of accuracy that maximizes …rm value, a opt . If Hence, it is not surprising that often …rms are reluctant to give in to calls for more transparency.
Yet, if maximizing …rm value does not lead to outsider's approval, the …rm is forced to alter its information system to persuade E. One way is to overinvest in information acquisition. If that is not su¢ cient, the …rm needs to commit to transparent communication, despite the negative consequences for internal decision-making. Hence, from the …rm's perspective, transparency is a necessary evil. 29 
Discussion
We view this paper as a …rst step towards an integral theory of the design and use of (formal and informal) information systems in …rms. Various subsequent steps are required to capture all aspects of an information system highlighted by Cyert and March (1963) . We have focused on how the main motives of informing, persuading, and impressing a¤ect information acquisition and communication. To do so, we have assumed a given, static decision-making procedure, a given set of stakeholders, a given, simpli…ed incentive structure, and observable expenditures on information acquisition. The e¤ects of each of these assumptions deserve to be explored. Below, we discuss several implications and extensions of our results.
Information often gets stored or processed in categories, even if the underlying data is continuous. Employee performance evaluation forms often have only three or …ve distinct categories of performance. Credit rating agencies assign …rms to one of a limited number of categories based on their assessment of the (continuous) probability of default. Our model provides a rationale. If information is to be stored or processed in a too precise manner, this strengthens potential incentives to manipulate information. By using broad categories, more reliable information can be obtained and retained.
We have shown that if …rms need to persuade outsiders, voluntary commitment to transparent reporting can be optimal. If such commitment is di¢ cult to sustain, regulation that requires transparency can be bene…cial for companies. At the same time, such regulation hurts companies that do not need to persuade outsiders and prefer private reporting to avoid the negative consequences of the impression motive. Hence, regulation that imposes transparency can have di¤erential e¤ects on …rms. Relatedly, we have shown that the possibility to manipulate information can back…re if …rms need to persuade outsiders. If transparent reporting does not su¢ ce, …rms can attempt to make their reports veri…able, for instance through hiring external auditors. However, this increases the cost of information acquisition, which also reduces the amount of information available.
Our model can also be used to illustrate the interaction between the decisionmaking process and the information system. In our model, the …nal decision on the project is made by I. At …rst glance, there is no reason in our model for X to delegate the …nal decision. Since the preferences of X and I are aligned, I would be willing to share his information about z with X. Note, however, that if we had assumed that X instead of I would make the …nal decision, X would lose the possibility of sending in ‡uential messages to E. Delegation of this decision, in combination with transparency in communication, thus creates the possibility to persuade outsiders. Similarly, our model can illustrate how incentive pay a¤ects the use of a …rm's information system. Above, we have shown that strong stock-based incentive pay for executives hinders communication to outsiders. Now suppose that X, but not I, receives a long-term incentive plan (LTIP), which makes that X cares about the stock price that arises after public P has observed I's decision d I . Under private reporting, a positive implementation decision is interpreted by P as a positive signal regarding …rm value. Thus the LTIP gives X an incentive to overstate v in communicating with I. By reducing the alignment of interests between X and I, the LTIP hinders internal communication, which in turn negatively a¤ects information acquisition. 30 and forecast speci…city choices. Journal of Accounting Research, 36(2), 167-190.
[5] Bandiera, O., Hansen, S., Prat, A., & Sadun, R. [17] Diamond, D. W. (1985) . Optimal release of information by …rms. The Journal of Finance, 40(4), 1071-1094. 4 . If E (r 2 ) = 0 and E (r 1 ) = 1, then E u X jk; r 2 E u X jk; r 1 is decreasing in k, types reporting r 2 are lower than types reporting r 1 so that E [vjr 2 ] < E [vjr 1 ], a contradiction.
We conclude that each report r n is sent by a subset of types f(k n 1 + 1) ; : : : ; k n g, which is fully characterized by the set of marginal types fk n g, n = 1; : : : ; N , with k n k n 1 and k n 1 0. In this case,
Moreover, the single-crossing property implies that if type k = k n prefers reporting r n to reporting r n+1 , all types k k n also prefer r n to r n+ for any 1, and if type k = k n 1 + 1 prefers reporting r n to reporting r n 1 , all types k k n 1 + 1 also prefer r n to r n+ for any 1 (the absence of local deviations implies the absence of global deviations). Thus, the necessary incentive compatibility constraints E u X jk n ; r n E u X jk n ; r n+1 0 (14)
E u X jk n + 1; r n+1 E u X jk n + 1; r n 0 (15) are also the su¢ cient equilibrium conditions. This proves item (i) of the proposition. It follows from cases 1 and 3 above that only one report, namely r 1 , may lead to no approval, so that E (r n ) = 1 for all k 2. This proves item (iii) of the proposition.
Next, consider the approval decision d E by E. Using (5) and I's strategy, the optimal strategy for E is to choose d E = 1 if and only if E u E jr > 0. Hence, E (r) = 1 if 2 ( E [v k jr]) 2 > h, and E (r) = 0 otherwise, which can be written as follows:
To prove item (ii), we rewrite the ICC in (14) for E (r n ) = 1 and E (r 1 ) = 0 correspondingly
These inequalities never hold when 1 2 . Hence, if 1 2 , the pooling equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the continuation game, which ends the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.
To determine the properties of N ( ; ; h), it is helpful to consider an auxiliary function a (N; ; ; h), de…ned as the lowest value of a for which the continuation game (a) has an equilibrium with N reports: a (N; ; ; h) = min fa 2 N : (a) has a PBE with N reportsg If, for some N , all equilibria for all a have less than N reports, we set a = 1. Function a (N; ; ; h) is monotonically increasing in N (as is shown below), so that N can be written as
We show below that a (N; ; ; h) is monotonically increasing in and h, and is decreasing in . Using this monotonicity property of a, the desired monotonicity property of N can be shown as follows (for brevity, we omit unnecessary arguments form argument lists). Take and 0 such that 0 < , so that a N ( ) ; a N ( ) ; 0 and a N ( ) + 1; a N ( ) + 1; 0 . By the de…nition of N ( ), a N ( ) ; < a N ( ) + 1; = 1. Therefore, The remaining part of the proof shows the monotonicity of a. We de…ne l n as the number of types sending report r n : l n k n k n 1 (18) Using (13) we express the ICCs (14) and (15) as follows, respectively:
(l n+1 l n ) G (k n ; a) + 4(1 )
where
Using (16), we write the equilibrium condition E (r 2 ) = 1 as
Consequently, conditions (19) , (20) , and (22) constitute all the necessary and su¢ cient conditions that any arbitrary sequence fl n g of size N must satisfy to represent a PBE of (k N ) with N reports. Conditions (19) and (20) can jointly be written as the following double inequality l L (k n ; l n ; a; n) l n+1 l H (k n ; l n ; a; n)
In the following Lemma, we establish properties of l L and l H that we use in the rest of the proof. 31 Lemma 6 Functions l L (k; l; a; n) and l H (k; l; a; n) have the following properties:
(i) For n 2, for n = 1 and l > 2 q 2h a, and for n = 1 and l < 2 q 2h a, l L and l H are increasing in (k; l; a; ), decreasing in , and independent of h;
(ii) For for n = 1 and l = 2 q 2h a, l L (l; l; a; 1) and l H (l; l; a; 1) are discontinuous, increasing in (h; a), and decreasing in (l; );
(iii) For n 2, l H l L > 4, and l H (l; l; a; 1) l L (l; l; a; 1) > 4;
(iv) l H (l; l; a; 1) l L (l + 1; l + 1; a; 1) > 2;
(v) Let, for some integers a, l 1 1, and l 2 > l 1 , it holds that l H (l 1 ; l 1 ; a; 1) < l 2 . Then, there exists an integer x 1 so that l L (l 1 + x; l 1 + x; a; 1) l 2 x l H (l 1 + x; l 1 + x; a; 1).
We also de…ne l as the smallest integer for l n+1 that satis…es (23):
l dl L e = min fz 2 Z : z l L g
To prove that a (N ) increases in N we take an arbitrary N such that a (N ) < 1 and assume, to the contrary, that a (N + 1) < a (N ) . Consider an equilibrium of the continuation game (a) for a = a (N + 1) with N + 1 reports. We will show that there exists an a 0 < a (N + 1) < a (N ) and there exists an equilibrium of the continuation game (a 0 ) with N reports. This will contradict the de…nition of a (N ). We construct this equilibrium iteratively in the following steps. We use the iteration number t as a superscript (t).
Step 1. We begin with the set fl n g, n 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g, from the equilibrium for a = a (N + 1) with N + 1 reports. At …rst iteration, we set l (1) n = l n for n 2 f1; : : : ; N g (we just truncate fl n g at N ) to obtain n l (1) n o , and proceed to Step 2.
Step 2. Using k
o may represent no equilibrium because (23) may fail. However, condition (22) holds by its monotonicity. We proceed to Step 3. due to the monotonicity, only the condition l (t) n+1
l H may fail in Step 3 so that the iterative procedure necessarily results in an equilibrium for h and a 0 a = a (N; h 0 ) with N reports. This implies that a (N; h 0 ) a (N; h). Similarly, the monotonicity of a in (by taking a (N; 0 ) < 1 and > 0 ) and in (by taking a (N; 0 ) < 1 and 0 > ) can be shown. This ends the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. For 1 2 , no separating equilibrium exists according to Lemma 1. Since a 1 in this case, the Lemma holds for 1 2 . In the reminder of the proof, < 1 2 is assumed.
In any equilibrium, the strategy of E is given by (16). In a separating PBE,
and E (r k ) = 1 for all k when h < 2 (v 1 ) 2 = h (a). In this case, the su¢ cient equilibrium conditions (19) and (20) . For integer a it is equivalent to a a, which ends the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Consider a PBE of (a). Since N a, when a a the proof is straightforward. Suppose that a > a and suppose a PBE exists with N > a reports. For expositional clarity, we introduce the following notation. Let integers x and q be x a a 1 and q N a 1 According to (8), a + 1 > 1+ 1+ 2 , and we de…ne to be
We also use l n as the number of types sending report r n , as given by (18) . The proof is conducted as follows. In Part 1, we show that l n weakly increases in n. Part 2 is by induction. We show that if (l n+1 l n ) y for some y 0 and all n N 1, then there is a lower-bound on a, a a LB . Using this lower bound, we show that ICC (19) implies (l n+1 l n ) y + 1 for all all n N 1. By induction, it follows that (l n+1 l n ) is unbounded, a contradiction. This result holds when N > a 2, and when a = 1 and N 3. Items (i) and (ii) of the lemma then follow. Part 1. Consider the ICC (19) . Since G (k; a) increases in k and H > 0, it follows that (l n+1 l n ) G (1; a) > (1 2 ) (3 + 2 (1 ) a + 2 (2x 1)) 1 > 1 due to 1. Since (l n+1 l n ) is integer, it must be that (l n+1 l n ) 0 for all n N 1.
Part 2. Suppose (induction assumption) that (l n+1 l n ) y for all n N 1 and some y 2 Z + . This assumption holds for y = 0. We obtain the following lowerbounds on a and k N 1 :
Using these lower bounds and (24), we evaluate G (k N 1 ; a) y:
Hence, G (k N 1 ; a) > y and, therefore, (l N l N 1 ) (y + 1). As a result, a a LB + 1. We consider cases a 2 and a 3 separately. Thus, (l n+1 l n ) (y + 1) for all n N 1.
2. Let a 3 and N 4. In this case, we use another induction argument. Suppose (l N j+1 l N j ) (y + 1) for all j 2 f1; : : : ; rg. This assumption holds for r = 1. We de…ne (new) lower bounds on a and on k N r 1 as follows:
Using (21) we show that G (k N r 1 ; a) > y. We consider cases y = 0 and y 1 separately.
(a) When y = 0, we de…ne J 1 (r) as the following lower-bound on ( k N r 1 + a):
Since J 1 (r) is a second degree convex polynomial, which increases for r > 1 2 , it follows that: 1 2 ) and using (24), we get
When y 1, we de…ne J 2 (r) as the following lower-bound on ( k N r 1 + a):
Since J 2 (r) is a second degree convex polynomial, it attains its minimum at r = r , where r = y y+1 (N 2). Therefore,
Using ( k N r 1 + a) J 2 (r ), we evaluate G (k N r 1 ; a) y:
Hence, …nally, G (k N r 1 ; a) > y.
Cases (a) and (b) imply G (k N r 1 ; a) > y so that (l N j+1 l N j ) (y + 1) holds for j = (r + 1). By induction, it holds for all j N 1. That is, (l n+1 l n ) (y + 1) for all n N 1.
In both cases 1 and 2, (l n+1 l n ) (y + 1) for all n N 1. By induction, (l n+1 l n ) y for any y 2 N, a contradiction. Therefore, N a if a 3 and N 2 if a 2. Since for a 2, the separating subgame equilibrium always exists, it follows that N = a if a 2. This occurs when 1+ (1+ ) 2 2, i.e., when 4+3 . When a = 1, N 2 so that N 2 as well. This ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a PBE of (a). Let U X (a) be the ex-ante expected utility of X. Taking expectations of (12) yields:
First, we show that over all equilibria with N reports of all continuation games, the separating equilibrium of (N ) maximizes U X (a). Second, we maximize (25) with respect to a over a 2 f2; : : : ; ag, according to Lemma 4. Fix the number of reports N 2 f2; : : : ; ag. Using (11) and (13), we write the ex-ante expected project value as follows:
We maximize (26) w.r.t. fk n g assuming k n are real numbers. For E (r 1 ) = 1, the …rst-order conditions are:
Hence, (26) attains its global maximum over fk n g, k n 2 R, when k n = 1 2 (k n 1 + k n+1 ), i.e., when intervals (k n k n 1 ) are of equal length for all n. It follows that (26) is maximized over a set of natural numbers fk n g, k n 2 N, when k n = nt for some t 2 N. In this case, a = N t and
When t = 1, we have a separating equilibrium of (N ). Hence, U X (N ) = 1 2 + 24 4
Maximizing (28) yields N = a opt given by (7). Moreover, E's strategy (16), h h (a ) assures E approves after receiving r 1 , E (r 1 ) = 1.
The above arguments are based on the assumption E (r 1 ) = 1 for all a. However, if E (v z) I jr 1 < h for some a > a , so that E (r 1 ) = 0 for these a, then the ex-ante expected utility U X (a) of X will be lower than in the above derivations. Therefore, a = N = a maximizes U X (a) for all a 2 N, including a > a . This ends the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. According to Lemma 4, when a = 1 then either N = 1 so that a = 1 is optimal, or N = 2 so that a 3. The limiting property of optimal a can be shown as follows. For N = 2, l 2 = a l 1 , and E (r 1 ) = 1, the ICC (19) is
According to (25) and (26), the expected utility of X in equilibrium, as a function of (l 1 ; a) is U X (l 1 ; a) = 1 2 + 32 5 1 2l 1 a 2 which monotonically increases in l 1 over 0; l 1 (a) . Therefore, taking the highest value l 1 = l 1 (a) is optimal for X. The necessary (and su¢ cient) condition for this is l 1 (a) 1, i.e., 1 2 2+ a . When 2(2+ ) , this condition does not hold for any a, and a = 1 is optimal. If, on the other hand, < 2(2+ ) , this condition only holds if a 2 ( 2(2+ ) ) . Hence, optimal a unboundedly increases if ! 2(2+ ) . This ends the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. In the limit & 0 , the ICCs (19) and (20) can be written as follows 2 E (r n ) l n 1 l n+1 2 E (r n ) l n + 2
Let there be N 2 reports in a PBE of (a) for a N . Suppose, …rst, that E (r 1 ) = 1. In this case, l n+1 = l n = 1 satis…es (29) and the largest N is achieved in the separating equilibrium when N = a. Using Lemma 3, the largest N among the equilibria where E (r 1 ) = 1 is achieved when a = a 0 where h (a 0 + 1) < h h (a 0 ).
When a increases by 1, a = (a 0 + 1), then E (r 1 ) = 0 and E (r 2 ) = 1 even when l 2 = l 1 = 1. The latter follows from E's strategy (16). As l 2 = l 1 = 1 still satis…es (29) , N also increases by 1, N = (a 0 + 1). Hence, the largest N arises when E (r 1 ) = 0. Now, we compute upper-bounds for N when E (r 1 ) = 0. We consider two cases.
1. Suppose l 2 (N 1). Then l n+1 l n 1 for n 2 f2; : : : ; N g, so that a = l 1 + N X n=2 l n l 1 + N X n=2 (l 2 (n 2)) > l 1 + 1 2 N l 2
Using E (r 2 ) = 1 (see Lemma 1) and (16) we write h 8a 2 (2l 1 + l 2 ) 2 so that p 8h (2l 1 + l 2 ) a > l 1 + 1 2 N l 2 . This can be rewritten as the following upper-bound on N :
2. Suppose l 2 (N 2). Then l n+1 l n 1 for n 2 f2; : : : ; l 2 + 1g and l n 1 for n 2 fl 2 + 2; : : : ; N g, so that a l 1 + l 2 +1 X n=2 (l 2 (n 2)) + N X n=l 2 +2 1 = l 1 + 1 2 (l 2 1) l 2 + N 1
Using h 8a 2 (2l 1 + l 2 ) 2 and l 1 1 2 (l 2 + 1) from (29) yields:
The right-hand side of this inequality is a second-degree polynomial in l 2 , which attains its maximum at l 2 = 2 p 8h . Hence,
Combining the two cases above results in N N max 4h + p 8h + 1 2 ; 6 p 8h 2 ; 2 , which ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let, for each N N consider a set A N of values of a such that for any a 2 A N , the corresponding continuation game (a) has a PBE (separating or partially separating) with N reports. First, we show for each N N , there is an a (N ) 2 A N such that choosing a > a (N ) is not optimal for X for any c. Second, we de…ne b a max N N 
a (N )
This maximum always exists and, by construction, a > b a is not optimal for X for any N . If A N is …nite, a (N ) is also …nite. Let A N be in…nite. For any a 2 A N , we consider a PBE a of (a) with N reports (if there are multiple equilibria, we choose a arbitrarily). We de…ne x n k n a and y n l n a = x n x n 1
The ex-ante expected utility U X (a) of X in PBE a is given by (25) . It follows that a only a¤ects U X (a) through the ex-ante expected project value, which can be written as follows:
where E a is the approval strategy of E in a . Next, we write the equilibrium condition (29) for a as follows: 
Consider a limit a ! 1 in which a takes on increasing values from A N . The interval 1 a ; 2 a converges to a point f0g. As E a (r 1 ) 2 f0; 1g, the sequence E a (r 1 ) either has a limit of 0 or 1, or it oscillates between these two values. The following three cases are possible.
1. Let E a (r 1 ) converge to 1. Then, E a (r 1 ) = 1 and (31) implies y n+1 = y n for all n in the limit. Hence, x n ! n N and (30) converges to: which is identical to the project value in the separating equilibrium with a = N , as given by (27) . This implies that by choosing unboundedly large a, X cannot get higher project value than by choosing a = N . Hence, (30) attains its maximum at some …nite value of a, a (N ).
2. Let E a (r 1 ) converge to 0. Then, E a (r 1 ) = 0 and (31) implies y n+1 = y n for n 2 and y 2 = 2y 1 in the limit. Hence, x n ! 2n 1 2N 1 and (30) converges to: which is identical to the project value obtained in the equilibrium where a = 2N 1 and k n = 2n 1. Hence, again, by choosing unboundedly large a, X cannot get higher project value than by choosing a = 2N 1, implying that (30) attains its maximum at some …nite value of a, a (N ).
3. Let E a (r 1 ) have no limit. The maximum of a (N ) from the two previous cases becomes the upper-bound on optimal a. When h 2 8 ; 6 , E only approves if a > a, where
If a a, choosing a = a is optimal, as this maximizes (36) . Suppose a < a. This occurs when c > c, where c 2 3 1 6 h 3 2 In this case, X either chooses a = a > a or chooses a = 1. Using (36) This ends the proof of item (iv) of the proposition.
Finally, consider X's internal reporting strategy I (k). It follows from (34) that r I only a¤ects X's payo¤ through the expected project value E [ (v z)]. Given I's strategy and using (1), type k prefers reporting r I k to r I k+ if
which holds for any . Hence, I (k) = r I k maximizes X's payo¤ for any type k.
